JellevanDijk.org

In design, putting ‘decoration’ on a product that has no other function than changing the appearance (’because it looks nice’), is often considered bad practice, or at least it is in danger of being so. Form follows function - and if it doesn’t, you better have a very good story to tell why.

In the design of digital systems, there is in principle no way that form can follow function because the functionalities simply have no form (other than bits being changed on a chip, but even that can have an innumerable amount of different forms just to create one and the same digital operation). The separation of form and function has been one of the pillars of the functionalist thesis in cognitive science: the physical implementation of a (cognitive) function can in principle have any particular form - and so the physical form is not what is important about understanding cognitive functions. For example, we can do arithmatic with pencil and paper, by hart, with a mechanical calculator, a microchip, or even with a complicated kind of mill. If we put that to the extreme, claiming that only human biological brains can be truly ‘intelligent’ is considered antropo-chauvinism: it excludes the possibility that the same ‘functions’ could be implemented in intelligent extra-terrestial Martian gass-clouds as well. (Or in human-built machines, for that matter).

Now when you design a digital photocamera the controls can in principle have any form you like, because the functions you attach to the controls are digital instead of mechanical. In old-fashioned mechanical camera’s, at least some controls reflected the mechanical operation that they controlled (zooming meant you had to change the distance of the lenses which was done right on the lense box itself, and going from one picture to the next meant you had to scroll the film over some distance, which you did with a hook attached to the scroll-wheel. The mappings between the controls and the functions were al ‘real’, executed as ‘real’ physical movements in time-space, not just digital metaphors implemented as flip-flops on a microchip. (Again, to press the point, the flip-flops in the end are of course implemented as real physical effects, i.e. changes in voltage in the microchip, but there is no fixed relation between what physically happens in the chip and the functional effect it has in the digital system. In some sense the *form* of the voltage changes contain no intrinsic meaning, it is not the *form* of the flip-flops that determines what a particular flip-flop *refers* to (what it ‘means’) - that relation is designed and arbitrary, we have fix on one particular table of relations in order to make the system actually work, but we could have designed another table of relations for creating exactly the same ‘meanings’).

Tangible interaction is interesting because it tries to return to these direct and intuitive mappings between the control (what the user does) and the function (what effect it has in the machine). But of course, since it is really all digital computing inside, tangible interaction is still in danger of being ‘just appearance’. What are the right ‘tangible mappings’ and how to decide on that? Suppose we make a hook on the right top corner of a digital camera and if you turn the hook this will ‘mean’ that you switch from a previously taken photograph to an open screen, camera ready, for taking another one? Would this be ‘good’ design? I don’t know. I guess it would be ‘too easy’, too ‘banal’ in some sense, to do that. So acknowledging that it has some intrinsic quality to return to a ‘form follows function’ kind of design doesn’t directly help you in getting it right, tangible interaction needs its own language and best practices. (Of which I have seen many wonderful examples at TU/e)

I was thinking of one other aspect that I haven’t read about a lot in discussions on tangible interaction. This is the fact that not only are the digital functions ‘without form’, also many of the ‘primary functions’ of the modern technologies we create are without form. With ‘primary functionality’ is meant the main function the product has for the user. So although there are many digital functions in a digital camera (zooming, taking the photo, storing it, changing the lighting etc..) all these technical functions serve the primary function of enabling a person to make photo’s.

However, there are many ‘activities’ that are not so easily defined as ‘making a photo’. Many activities in our daily, Western lives are ‘thinking’ activities. Say you want to design a tool that enables you to ‘be more creative’, to ‘think more precise’, to ‘get to the core of a problem’, to ’save important bits of information’, to ‘learn from experiences’, etc…

Now I am definitely not a ‘functionalist’ in the sense I defined above. Embodied cognition is basically the anti-thesis of functionalism in cognitive science: it states that the physical forms matter, in fact, the physical forms of the body (including brain activity, but also the body proper), the world, and the dynamic patterns of our body as it is acting in that world, are the fundamental grounding of cognition. What you think is *specifically* determined by, and dependent on, those forms, not ‘designed’ on the basis of some computational table of relations that ‘implements’ abstract functions in an (arbitrary) physical format. If you think a particular thought, it would not be possible to design another system, with another physical form, that ‘thinks exactly the same thought’. This also means that you and I can never ‘think the same thought’. We can agree on the meaning of a word in a language (let’s both think of a banana!) but what we actually think when we decide to think of a banana is never the same for you and me.

No I am not presenting the full argument (don’t know if I could), but just let us assume that this is the case.

Then how would you design a modern, digital technological device, that should support “thinking” in general?

Perhaps that design question is the wrong question to ask. “Thinking” is not something like “taking a photograph”. You can “think about taking a photograph”, and that would be most easy to do if you have a photo-camera in hand. But you can also think about “Sailing” and that would be more easy if you actually sit in a sailboat, and holding a photocamera would only get in the way. So it seems that, in any case in the naive sense of ‘thinking’, there is no form that connects a product to ‘thinking’ as a general function of human life, since any particular thought is supported by different, particular forms. Thinking is best supported *using* the very things that we care to think *about*.Or saying it another way: thinking doesn’t happen in the void, it is always part of a particular activity involving particular objects and structures in the real world. Thinking doesn’t exist, only ‘thinking about X while doing Y’ does. And the physical forms that are relevant here are the forms of X and Y, not some abstract ‘form of thought’.

So although embodied cognition is antithetical to functionalism, in the end, for the designer, they both have the same problem: there doesn’t seem to be any easy, reliable relation between ‘a thought’ and ‘the physical world’ that you can work with, while it is these kinds of relations (like the hook and the film-scroll-function) that you would want to have in order to guide your design.

The only way, I guess, is to create a system where the particular form of the interface is completely arbitrary - and doesn’t get in the way- and behind this arbitrary form is a flexible ‘world’ where one can create ones own personal set of ‘thinking tools’. This world might be either digital or physical, as long as the world is large and flexible enough such that everybody can create a ’sub-world’ that fits his own particular purposes.

One such ‘product’ is the world itself!

The digital world of the internet is another such world perhaps, although the interface to it definetely gets in the way and it is the question whether the internet can be seen as a full-blown world or still only as a metaphorical model of it.

Here my thoughts stop (or my world ends) … to be continued

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Een klassieke interpretatie van ‘kennis’ zou stellen dat hoe meer kennis je hebt (betreffende onderwerp X) hoe zekerder je bent over onderwerp X. Zie ook het welbekende rijtje: meten is weten, weten is voorspellen, voorspellen is beheersen. Het is de bril van de ingenieur, die wetenschappelijke kennis gebruikt om te zorgen dat hij *zeker* weet dat zijn brug niet instort.

Een belichaamde interpretatie van ‘kennis’ (o.a. geinspireerd door ideeen uit de fenomenologische traditie) formuleert het fenomeen anders. Hier is kennis met name iets wat er voor zorgt dat je ‘verder kunt’ met waar je mee bezig was. Kennis is wat je gebruikt om te goed te handelen: dat te doen wat juist is. En niet al het goede handelen is gebaseerd op een ‘zeker weten’. Je kunt ook ‘weten’ dat je goed handelt (met betrekking tot onderwerp X), zonder dat je precies weet wat je doet, zonder dat je precies weet hoe het moet, zonder dat je precies weet wat X is en wat er met X moet gebeuren. En toch doe je het juiste. De timmerman die een tafel probeert te timmeren heeft veel minder “kennis” van tafels dan in de klassieke zin nodig zou zijn om *zeker* te weten dat de tafel een goede tafel wordt. Maar die timmerman gaat aan het werkt en maakt die tafel evengoed en het wordt een goede tafel. Natuurlijk kun je zijn vaardigheid wel als kennis beschrijven - dan is het ‘tacit knowledge’. Maar dat is geen ‘zeker weten’ (hoe een hamer werkt, wat je moet doen met de hamer in alle voorkomende gevallen, enzovoorts). Wat de ervaren timmerman wel zeker weet, of bijna zeker, is dat hij het probleem wel zal oplossen zodra hij er zich voor gesteld staat. En wat hij ook*voelt* (we komen nu bij het voelen) is wanneer het ‘de verkeerde kant op gaat’, of ’spannend wordt’, of ‘tijd is om even uit te rusten en er van een afstand naar te kijken’. Dat is een heel ander soort weten. Dat is voelen, voelen van binnen, een sterk lichamelijk gevoel. Een echt bedreven, ervaren persoon (met betrekking tot onderwerp X), durft in volkomen duister te tasten, en zonder enige garanties en zekerheid aan een klus te beginnen, omdat de zekerheid niet in de informatie zit die hem tot beschikking staat maar in zijn eigen zekerheid, die hij van binnen voelt, dat hij de capaciteit heeft om het probleem op te lossen.

Eigenlijk zou je kunnen zeggen dat kennis in de belichaamde zin van het woord dienst doet om ons te helpen ons zo veel en zo lang mogelijk ‘goed’ te voelen, en om zo snel en efficient mogelijk ons weer ‘beter’ te voelen, als we bemerken dat we ons niet langer goed voelen. De juiste handeling is de handeling die uiteindelijk weer innerlijke rust oplevert.

Zoals Pirsig zegt: op het moment dat de gedachten van de handwerksman tot rust komen, is zijn werkstuk gereed.

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Harry van Vliet, lector crossmedia bij de HU, liet vandaag dit zien tijdens een overleg, best grappig:

Tegelijkertijd, waarom denken mensen toch altijd dat gewone boeken *minder* interessant zouden zijn dan dit? Ik denk dat het tegendeel het geval is. Een flash-interactie is zoveel ‘armer’ dan de ‘mentale’ interactie die je kunt hebben met een boek. Denk aan het verschil tussen “het boek” en “de film”. Mooi gemaakt, die film, maar hij bleef minder hangen dan het boek, misschien juist wel omdat het zo met geluid en muziek en mooie plaatjes in je gezicht knalde. Bewegend beeld is enorm dwingend. Een papier met tekst en/of illustratie heeft een bepaalde ‘interactie-rust’, die het initiatief aan jou laat, de lezer.

Er zit een nog algemenere les aan vast. Stel bijvoorbeeld dat je als gemeente ambtenaar ziet dat een groep jongeren altijd op een bepaalde straathoek rondhangt, bij een klein plantsoentje met drie bomen en een bankje. Ze zitten op de rand van dat bankje en parkeren hun brommer tegen die boom. Mevrouw Jansen van om de hoek heeft er last van. Zo kan dat niet langer. Maar die jongens moeten toch een plek hebben om te kunnen ‘hangen’ (de gemeenteambtenaar heeft een cursus gehad). De ambtenaar besluit samen met een jongeren-expert en een hippe designer om een ‘hangplek’ te bouwen, een stukje verderop. Drie maanden later staat de hangplek er. Zes maanden later blijkt de hangplek ongebruikt: de jongeren zitten nog steeds het meeste op hun bankje. Waarom? Omdat een boek leuker is dan de film. Daarom.

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Ik werk veel met het begrip ‘koppeling’. Dat komt uit die theorie van Embodied Cognition: dynamic couplings emerge within in the continuous interaction between the organism and its environment. Ik heb hier en daar beweerd dat je dus moet streven naar een sterke ‘koppelingen’ tussen mens en product, als je een interactief product ontwerpt. Gebruiksonvriendelijke producten veroorzaken een ‘kink’ in de kabel van de interactie: je ervaart ontkoppeling. Fijne producten zitten als dat ouwe leren jasje dat je maar niet weg kan doen: jij en dat jasje zijn samen een. Er is een sterke koppeling en die wordt in het gebruik telkens herbevestigd.

Maar ik heb ook een sterke koppeling met mijn computer. Ik zit maar te typen en te surfen en vooral die email, die koppelt zich aan mij als een stalker waar ik niet vanaf kom. Twitter heb ik nog op afstand kunnen houden, maar alhoewel de zon schijnt en mijn rug pauze nodig heeft en ik nog niet eens heb gelunched zit ik hier dit weblog te schrijven. Belachelijk! Dit is niet de koppeling die ik voor ogen had.

Ik stel voor dat er een onderscheid moet komen tussen *goede* koppelingen, die een positieve vorm van symbiose tot gevolg hebben, of in ieder geval een vorm waar *ik* uiteindelijk beter van word. En dan heb je ook slechte koppelingen. Die werken net zoals verslavingen. Ik koppel aan de email en aan dat grote mooie scherm met al die windowtjes met tekstjes die naar mij roepen dat ze gelezen worden net zoals ik koppel aan die koek in de koektrommel, dat wijntje als ik thuis kom van het werk, en zoals anderen zich koppelen aan sigaretten, televisie, shoppen, je werk, of aan cocaine of crack.

De verslavingskoppeling aan je computer en internet is de meest gevaarlijke. Het lijkt namelijk alsof ik stiekem toch een goede daad heb gedaan. Alsof ik door het spuiten van mijn informatie-heroine tegelijkertijd toch iets goeds doe. Ik heb toch immers dit blogje geschreven? Heb ik daarvan niet iets geleerd (altijd goed, iets leren) heb ik daarmee niet iets gepresteerd (altijd goed, iets bedenken, iets maken) heb ik daarmee anderen geen leesplezier geschonken (altijd goed, iets voor een ander doen). En toch is het slecht. Het is drugs zoals ieder andere vorm.

Ik ga stoppen!

Ik begin morgen!

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Mathematician Arnold, I just read somewhere, started a book saying: “Mathematics is a part of Physics”. And then “Mathematics is the part of Physics where experiments are cheap”.

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Here’s the quick abstract for what I will be talking about on the symposium on Creative Spaces on 17 june. But basically there is too much in it, and the story is too ‘big’ (too much to get your head around in one talk). So I want to narrow it down and slow it down a bit. I have been sort of lured into setting up the summary this way because I read one of the other contributers and they explicitly presented and “information processing model” of creative rooms. I thought that sounded very out-dated, but perhaps is is actually very modern! Is information processing back on the road again? Everything comes back, eventually, doesn’t it? Anyway I had to respond to that in some way I felt.

But I guess my ‘wooden horses’ about embodiment and embeddedness of cognition might themselves be sort of wearing off. Still, the practical issues underlying it are valid: Designers see computers as, well, as computers. And if they design on the basis of that conception, they will affect our lives in certain ways. While in fact computers do not have to be designed to be ‘computers’ for us, nowadays, computers can be anything, and we should quickly find out what we *want* computers to be for us instead of slowly drifting into a life in which everything is defined as an information search, storage and retrieval+ (storing my love in you, retrieving my self-esteem from my work, searching for inspiration with a walk in google-forest.

Feedback welcome.

TITLE Digital devices as embodied enablers: How computers may become part of an embodied, situated creative space.

SUMMARY

Parallel to the technological development of digital computing came the theoretical model of cognitivism, aka the information-processing view, in which human thought and action were seen primarily as processes of representation and computation. If human activity, e.g., a brainstorm in a creative room, is interpreted as an information proces, then the computer quite naturally connects to that proces, because a computer is essentially an information processing system. On the grounds of this fundamental philosophical assumption, one that is very much engrained in our popular technological culture, many computer applications have been developed. Such applications give the computer a role that highlight the information-processing aspects of the activity, or even force people to see it that way (in order to be able to use the system). Hence, such systems will ask the user to store information, retrieve information, compare data, represent their world in concrete linguistic units, symbolize things, categorize under name headings, and calculate ‘best next actions’, and so on. For example, in the creative environment, computer systems have been used to reduce the complex and subtle social activity of brainstorming to a ‘group decision’ proces, in which ’statements’ are summarized into ‘conclusions’ that are automatically generated by the computer. Moreover, in such a system, the physical forms and movements of the user and the system are completely irrelevant. In fact, in group decision rooms each user sits behind a screen and the the whole creative process is reduced to a purely ‘mental’ process in which the body and movement in space are disconnected from the activity.

The cognitivist interpretation of human thought has been under serious attack since the rise of an alternative theory called Embodied and Situated Cognition. According to ESC, intelligent action arises in action, as an emergent property from the tight interplay between the human body, the physical structure of the physical environment, the brain and the social setting. ESC puts realtime dynamic couplings, not information-processing, at the hart of the cognitive system. Given this new model, an interesting question becomes what the role of the computer might be within such an embodied system. In this presentation I take the creative room as a case-study. I will give examples of prototypes we have developed where the computer plays a fundamentally different role than that of a storage device for representations or a calculator of rational conclusions. Instead, the computer becomes a subtle assistent to an ongoing embodied interactions between people and the environment.

This new way of seeing computers asks new questions of designers. First: how do the physical aspects of the artefact relate to it’s digital properties? In an embodied view those two cannot be seen as seperate. Thus one cannot design software independent from the industrial design or interior design of the space, as is the standard practice of today. Perhaps some of the things one would easily design in software, may be just as well be supported by physical forms in the space (e.g. tangible interaction), and perhaps some of the things that one would normally design physically might now become interwoven with software in subtle ways (e.g. augmented reality). The second question relates to the design process: considering that embodied and situated activities are complex, personal and context dependent (based on your body in that particular environment in that social context at that particular time), how may we analyse these systems such that we can design for them? One approach may be not to analyse first and design later, but instead to engage in an iterative, participatory design process by which the design and the user’s world are strongly intertwined activities, such that the design solution will itself be an ‘emergent’ result of an ongoing coupling proces between designers, users, and the evolving prototype.

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I am currently writing a book chapter for a book in which theoretical perspectives and  practical experiences meet. The book is about design, research and user involvement (e.g. co-design and participatory design). It is not a ‘positive’ book in the sense of a methods book or a straightforward plea for co-design, rather it is more critically ‘opening the box’: what are the real problems of putting these ideas into practice and what are some of the more fundamental reasons why some things might or might not work.

In my chapter I am going to challenge the naive goal of designers to try and ‘understand’ the end-user. Much of the work in ‘user centered desin’ is focussed on that: the designer organizes research-activities in order to better ‘understand’ the end-user. But the question is whether we can really understand ‘the other’ in a way that goes beyond the obvious, or in a way that goes beyond that which you already put into the explanation yourself.

When you consider that the way I use a product - and whether that gives me satisfaction - is determined by a complex web of interactions between my brain, my body, the structure of the environment and the properties of the product, the goal I have currently in pursuit, the things I had just been doing, how I socially relate to other people and my role in the organizational system, my culture, and so on, then you realize that “understanding the user” is just three words standing in for a very long story.

Instead of saying how you should do your best to try and ‘understand’ the user I propose to by-pass understanding altogether. Because what we are after all doing is designing a product. So if we can do that without mutual understanding, then all the better, because understanding is difficult, perhaps too difficult.

So instead of understanding each other, consider that the user and the designer will *work on the design* together. In between the designer and the user, then, would stand the evolving product (prototype) itself, and that prototype would serve as an interface between the thoughts and actions, well, the ‘life’ of the designer on the one hand and the thoughts and actions, well, the ‘life’ of the user on the other. The designer’s interpretation of what ‘we are doing’ might be very different from the user’s interpretation of ‘what we’re doing’, but that doesn’t matter so long as everybody is satisfied about ‘what we’re doing’.

One of the interesting questions emerges is whether we know of examples in which it was clear that the resulting design (product, building, service) was relevant, good, high quality work, and yet at the same time it was also clear that the contributing people *did not understand each other at all*.

Does anybody know of such examples?

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Mooi filmpje van Otto doorgekregen. Wat ik er met name boeiend aan vind is om te zien of duidelijk wordt wat voor affordances de kat waarneemt, en of de digitale objecten dezelfde status hebben als de fysieke objecten. Het lijkt - maar hoe bewijs je dat - alsof de kat voornamelijk verbaast is, en op zoek blijft naar “wat het ding is waar ik nu aan krab”. Ze lijkt er ook steeds onder te zoeken, de tablet af en toe bijna van tafel schuivend. Maar misschien is dit mijn gekleurde interpretatie. Iemand een alternatief?

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Yesterday I overheard colleagues talking about a robot, I couldn’t find out if it actually exists or whether it was presented as a concept. The one colleague said to the other (if I remember correctly):

“Picture this. The robot is wandering around in the factory. It doesn’t even know where it is, it only knows how to recognize the object and it knows how to act upon it”

(I think the robot he was reffering to is what they call a ‘pick-and-place’ robot that is able to do fast and acurate placing of micro-electronic elements, because that is what these colleagues’ research is about)

“So, this robot is wandering around, not knowing where it is, and at a certain point it encounters the object it must do the placing on. Of course it must first recognize the object as being the object. Then, upon recognizing the object, it will process the visual input and determine it’s own position in relation to the object. It will then recognize that it has not positioned itself correctly in order to be able to do the placement. So, it must know how to reorient itself, carry out that movement, and then place the unit”.

I think Gibsonian perception theory and embodied philosophy could provide a new angle on this story. An embodied philosophy would, I believe, not state the problem as it is framed above. Embodied philosophy would sort of turn the whole story upside down. According to embodied theory, the proces that in biologcal organisms underlies object recognition is not an ‘object recognition module’. Instead, it is precisely the re-orienting proces that ensures that you position your body ‘in the right way’ with respect to the object, that helps you recognize it for what it is. In fact, the gradual repositioning of your body with respect to the body *is*, to all ends and purposes, equivalent to “object recognition”.

Another way of putting this is that ‘recognition’ of an object is first and foremost ‘recognition of the object’s affordances’. The affordance of the object, that is “that set of behaviors that the object directly ‘afford’s, or elicits”, immediately set in motion in the organism reorienting movements that reposition the body towards, what Merleau-Ponty called, ‘maximal grip’. But this is, as I see it, a reciprocal relationship. So just as we can say that the object elicits in the body reorienting movements, we could also say that repositioning of the body is the process the organism uses in order to perceive the affordances in the first place. Both affordance and the behaviors that couple to it iteratively influence one another and just when the organism has taken the right perspective in order to be able to effectively ‘deal with’ the object, it will also recognize the object for what it is. And what it ‘is’, the object, *is* what the organism finds meaningful in doing with it.

So if this robot’s place on earth is to pick-and-place stuff on this object, then, at least according to an embodied philosophy,  should be functioning in such a way that it would *not* first recognize the object for what it is, but that it would use visual input patterns directly in order to continuously reorient itself towards the ideal position for doing the placing movement. And achieving maximal grip (positioning the robot such that it can do the placement) then amounts to “having recognized the object for what it affords”. The whole “object recognition module” in my colleagues scenario can be by-passed. What the robot would need, I speculate, is a layered, behavioral-based architecture similar to the architectures of Rodney Brooks’ robots. One layer above the ‘wandering’ layer would be an ‘orientation’ layer that would try to get maximal grip on objects that afford ‘placing my unit on’. I wonder what my colleagues think about this idea, because it is probably far away removed from the conventional perspective on robot control, in which embodiment and affordances are still relatively unknown concepts.

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… is not just fiddling around,

…but in fact a recent species of the tools used in concept design.

Some designers are good at sketching with a pencil on paper (Sketching is a necessary part of design, like ‘writing field notes’ is for anthropologists). When interaction design started to mature (a bit, the field is about 40 years old according to some people), the paper prototype, the Wizard of Ozz trick and the ‘enacted video’ became popular, trying to capture more of the ‘look-and-feel’ of the form of the *interaction* with the product (the dynamics, i.e., seeing how what you do effects what you perceive, and so on) instead of just the physical form of the product itself.

But a paper prototype is just as much not moving as is a paper sketch. And a WoO you can do only once: your team-member can’t forever hide under the table with that laptop. And the enacted video is a video of other people interacting, so you cannot do it yourself to experience what you would experience while doing it.

High times have thus arisen for the true techies. You may come out of under your stones, where you have been hiding ever since people started shouting that design and user-studies are more important than hard-core programming. Because if you are capable of it (I’m not, but my respect is all for those who are) you might do concept design of interactive products by a new kind of sketching, using a new kind of pencil, that is, creating sketches using interactive hardware itself.

This, in fact, amounts to using a sort-of fully working prototype *as a sketch*. The prototype is therefore no longer the end product, it is part of the sketching process.

It is called: Sketching in hardware. And there’s an annual conference. See this comprehensive blogposting

So if you are a student that gets complaints by teachers (me?) that you are not *thinking* and only *fiddling around with hardware*, you can now say: I am not fiddling around at all, I am sketching in hardware. (Beware if you are not *thinking* about what you are doing at the same time, though).

Slightly off-topic: Compare this to the practices of my anthropologist friends: imagine you would be able, using great skill and the right sort of tools, to create full-blown ethnographies (that is, the books one used to be creating  *after* returing from field study) including all the theoretical linkages and deep philosophical reflections, but this time on the fly, right there in Papua New Guinney, and let these ethnographies have a function not as being the end-result, but simply as a new kind of ‘field notes’, open to further reflection?

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